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1 Introduction 
In February 2000 the EU opened accession negotiations with the last of 
the countries that were to become members in 2004 and 2007 (EU-101). 
Ten years after the more or less peaceful revolutions these countries had 
made remarkable progress in the transformation processes towards 
democracy and market economy. The economies had stabilized and 
started to grow. In the political sphere party systems as a “set of parties 
that interact in patterned ways”2 had developed. Despite of this apparent 
consolidation some of the parliamentary elections in the EU-10 in the 
periods 2000-2003 and 2004-2007 saw landslide victories of complete 
newcomers. In other cases, however, new parties remained marginal or 
failed to pass the representation threshold.3 
The following paper aims at investigating why new parties were so 
successful in some countries/ elections, while failing in others. The 
background section provides an overview about the existing literature on 
emergence and success of new parties – in ‘old’ and ‘new’ democracies. 
Independent variables not yet addressed in research are identified. The 
second part describes frameworks for analysis and develops hypotheses. 
Operationalization and measurement of the variables is then followed by 
analysis and discussion of the results.  
 
2 Background 
2.1  New Parties in ‘Old’ Democracies 
New party entry and success are relatively rare events in established 
democracies. In the period between 1945 and 1991 only one new party 
emerged in any given election in these countries, gathering on average 
2% of the vote.4 This is probably the reason why the issue attracted 
scientific attention only seldom until the mid-1980s. The available literature 
focuses on the conditions of new party entry. Factors influencing the 
                                                 
1
 The EU-10 comprises Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
2
 Mainwaring & Torcal 2006 p. 205 
3
 New parties competed in all of the elections of the respective periods - except for 
Hungary 2006. 
4
 Hug 2001, quoted as in Tavits 2007a p. 2 
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success of new parties are less well understood. The study presented 
here will therefore start with summarizing the findings on factors 
influencing new party formation/ entry. 
In 1985 Harmel and Robertson presented a comprehensive empirical 
study on new party formation. They tested hypotheses for explanatory 
variables organized in three broad groups of factors: social, political and 
structural.5 Social factors cover the emergence of new cleavages and/ or 
issues. Political factors range from characteristics of the party system over 
features of the new party itself to the relationship between party, voter and 
civil society. Structural determinants are electoral rules and the electoral 
focus.6 Their analysis revealed that the “socio-cultural environment” (large 
populations, sectionalism, heterogeneity and pluralism) has a significant 
influence on the emergence of new parties.7 There was, however, no 
correlation between political and structural determinants and the formation 
of new parties.8  
In the ensuing decade research focused on particular groups of new 
parties: left-libertarian and radical right wing. Kitschelt’s work on both 
groups9 provides evidence that societal transformations giving rise to new 
issues are a necessary condition for the emergence of new parties. They 
represent the ‘demand-side’10 and can explain “why there is pressure to 
represent [left-libertarian (newly arising)] interests in the political arena.”11 
The emergence of new cleavages and/or issues is, however, not a 
sufficient condition for the emergence of new parties. It is the ‘political 
opportunity structure’ that determines whether, when and under which 
label new parties will be established.12 One of the factors shaping 
opportunity structure is the configuration of and power relations in the 
                                                 
5
 Harmel & Robertson 1985 p. 503; the dependent variable in the study is the number of 
new parties formed over a time period of 21 years (1960-1980). 
6
 Presidential or parliamentary 
7
 Harmel & Robertson 1985 p. 513 
8
 Ibid. p. 516  
9
 Kitschelt 1988 and 1995 
10
 In Kitschelt’s terminology; Kitschelt 1995 
11
 Kitschelt 1988 p. 209; brackets and addition in italics added 
12
 Kitschelt 1988 pp. 209 and 223/224; Besides the structure of party competition 'political 
opportunity structure' for left-libertarian parties also comprises the existence of a 
comprehensive welfare state, the level of corporatism and the intensity of the nuclear 
controversy as precipitating condition.   
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party system - the "structures of party competition." In the case of left-
libertarian parties government participation by the left and lack of 
cohesiveness of the opposite political block are positively correlated with 
new party formation.13 The emergence of new radical right-wing parties, 
on the other hand, benefits from convergence of the moderate parties 
towards the centre.14 In 2001 Hug15 presented a game theoretic approach 
to explain new party entry. Using this as a starting point Tavits16 
suggested a model where strategic calculations of elites take into account 
the cost of entry (registration costs and electoral rules), probability of 
electoral support (dependent on the level of crystallization of the support 
base of existing parties) and benefits of holding office (possibility to 
influence policy) when deciding whether to enter electoral competition with 
a new party or not. Empirical data support her model.  
Taken together the conditions for the emergence of new parties and their 
entry into the electoral arena can be described17 in the following way: the 
emergence of new cleavages/ issues creates demand and is, thus, a 
necessary but not sufficient condition. This demand can only be politicized 
through the formation of a new party if the political and structural 
conditions are permissive, if benefits outweigh costs and are judged as 
being so by the elites. Table 1 summarizes the factors characterizing the 
opportunity structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Kitschelt 1988 pp. 215-217 
14
 Kitschelt 1988 and 1995 
15
 Hug 2001; Hug suggests a model of strategic "interaction between established parties 
and groups that contemplate forming a new party" (p. 38) to explain why and how political 
and institutional factors influence the formation process of new parties (p. 37). Based on 
this model he suggests five empirical implications as having an influence on new party 
emergence: the importance of new issues, formation costs, the costs of fighting the new 
party, the benefits for the new party and the benefits for the established party resulting 
from an accepted high demand (p. 60).  
16
 Tavits 2006 
17
 Drawing on Kitschelt 1988/ 1995 and Tavits 2006 
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Party system variables – 
Probability of electoral 
support 
Structural variables – 
Entry costs  
Political ‘system’ variables –
benefits of holding office 
General: ‘crystallization’ of 
the support base of existing 
parties (Tavits 2006) 
Radical right parties: 
Ideological convergence of 
moderate conservative and 
social-democratic parties 
(Kitschelt 1995) 
Left-libertarian parties: 
Low cohesiveness of the 
opposite political block 
(Kitschelt 1988) 
Legal environment: 
- registration costs  
- signature requirements 
Electoral system: 
- proportionality  
(Tavits 2006) 
Degree of policy-making 
outside electoral channels 
(level of corporatism) (Kitschelt 
1988 and Tavits 2006) 
 
Thus, an empirically grounded and theoretically understood picture is 
emerging with respect to the formation of new parties. What makes a new 
political party successful is, however, less well understood.  
Harmel and Robertson found that the nature of the electoral system with 
regard to its proportionality affects new parties’ success. In addition 
political variables as the effective number of parties and the “number of 
effective dimensions in [the] existing party system” determine electoral 
support for new parties.18  
Other studies have addressed electoral support for the newly emerging 
extreme right between 1970 and 199019 or the determinants of success of 
Green parties in Western Europe,20 without however focussing on the 
elections in which these fielded candidates for the first time. A detailed 
study on new party success in Western Europe was recently presented by 
Quenter.21 He provides evidence on the impact of party system 
fragmentation and polarization, as well as of the frequency of alternation in 
                                                 
18
 Harmel & Robertson 1985 pp. 516-517 
19
 Jackman & Volpert 1996 
20
 Müller-Rommel 1992 
21
 Quenter 2001 
Table 1  Political and structural conditions for new party formation and entry into 
electoral competition.  
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government on the success of new parties. Finally, a sideline of Hug’s22 
investigation on the formation of new parties deals with their initial 
success. Overall, his evidence is mixed, giving strong support only for the 
notion that new parties “appear to be more successful with increasing 
importance of new issues.”23 
Hence, empirical evidence and especially theorizing on the initial success 
of new parties when fielding candidates for the first time is largely elusive. 
Tavits sums up two decades of research on new parties by stating that  
“So far, however, studies on new parties remain restricted to 
advanced democracies where new parties are less consequential to 
the electoral and political process. These previous studies have 
struggled with building strong empirical support for the theoretical 
models of new party entry and we still lack a consistent 
explanation for the electoral support for new parties…”24  
 
2.2 New Parties in ‘New’ Democracies 
It is due to Margit Tavits that insights into the formation and electoral 
success of new parties in Eastern Europe are now available. In a first step 
she applies her model of new party entry (see above) to Eastern Europe 
and can corroborate her earlier findings. That is, entry costs determined by 
the proportionality of the electoral system, benefits of office and the 
probability of electoral support are the factors entering in elite calculations 
whether to compete with a new party or not.25 Tavits’ analysis of variables 
influencing first-time electoral support for new parties26 centres on voter 
disappointment and the lack of acceptable alternatives. Voter 
disappointment resulting from the experience of economic adversity is 
shown to have high explanatory capacity with respect to electoral support 
for new parties. In addition Tavits could show that “when the number of 
parties that have not been part of a governing coalition decreases, people 
are more willing to coordinate on a newcomer at the expense of the 
                                                 
22
 Hug 2001 
23
 Ibid. p. 114 
24
 Tavits 2007a p. 3 (emphasis added) 
25
 Tavits 2007a 
26
 Ibid.  
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existing parties.”27 A third factor affecting new parties’ success is their 
strategic policy choices.28 Drawing on spatial voting theories Tavits 
develops a model and provides empirical evidence for the notion that 
strategic placement close to sizeable neighbours and emphasis of issues 
on which sizeable neighbours exist increases chances of electoral 
success.  
 
3 Identifying ‘Missing Links,’ Defining Sample and 
Timeframe 
3.1  ‘Missing Links’ 
Three determinants of new party electoral support in Eastern Europe have 
been addressed by Tavits: the economic situation of the voter, the 
exhaustion of alternatives in government, and the choices of the new party 
with respect to placement in ideological and issue space as well as 
regarding the decision which issues to emphasize. Thus, it is important 
where a new party places itself in inter-party competition. But are there 
characteristics of this competition on the side of the established parties 
that favour electoral support for new parties in Eastern Europe? And does 
the ‘political space’ delimitated by the established parties play a role? 
Characteristics of competition between the established parties have not 
yet been in the focus of studies on new party success – except for Mair 
noting in the broader context of party system change that relatively closed 
patterns of party competition decrease chances for new parties.29 
Evidence on the importance of ‘political space’ (described in terms of 
polarization) comes from the studies on particular groups of new parties.30 
Quenter’s results, although not fully conclusive, also point in this 
direction.31 Therefore, the study presented here will attempt to analyse the 
impact of competition patterns and distribution of parties in ‘political 
space’.  
                                                 
27
 Ibid. p. 19 
28
 Tavits 2007b 
29
 Mair 1997 p. 211 
30
 Abedi 2002; Müller-Rommel 1992 
31
 Quenter 2001 
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The second part will touch on the conditions under which new parties 
compete in electoral campaigns. The issues of party and campaign 
financing have been investigated in the context of new party entry – with 
contradicting results in the case of public funding.32 There are no studies, 
however, addressing the possible impact of campaign regulations on initial 
electoral success of new parties. A comparative analysis of legal 
provisions for conducting electoral campaigns will therefore form the 
second part of the study.   
 
3.2  Defining Sample and Timeframe  
The subject of the first part of the investigation determines the time-period 
and sample set to be studied. To analyse competition in party systems first 
of all such a system, characterized by "patterned interaction between a 
set of parties," must exist. This implies that there is some regularity in 
interaction and a minimum of continuity with at least some of the parties 
having been around for some time.33 Second, to analyse patterns the 
study has to take a retrospective look. From these it follows that the 
elections to be studied should be preceded by some years of democratic 
development - facilitating the establishment of a party system. Ideally they 
should also be preceded by at least two elections34 / one change in 
government - to elucidate patterns with regard to coalition preferences in 
different settings. These criteria are met by starting the analysis in the year 
2000 and limiting the sample set to the EU-10. 
 
4 Frameworks and Hypotheses – Competition, Space, 
and Campaigning  
4.1 Competition 
The starting point of the analysis is the assumption that the voter as 
rational actor aiming at maximizing his35 benefits will try to avoid 
                                                 
32
 Tavits 2006 and 2007a; Bolin 2007  
33
 Mainwaring & Torcal 2006 p. 205 
34
 Excluding the founding election. 
35
 Using only the male form of nouns, personal and possessive pronouns in the study 
presented is solely due to reasons of ease in writing and reading - the female form is 
implicitly included.  
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uncertainty. Benefits in this case are constituted by the representation of 
the voter’s interests. They run along three dimensions. The first is how well 
the voter’s preferences match those of the elected party. The second and 
third are interlinked and concern the likelihood of his interests being 
represented (What are the chances for the chosen party to pass the 
representation threshold?) and the likelihood of the represented interests 
to influence policy outcome (government participation). There are two 
dimensions of intra-party competition that can be assumed to have an 
impact on the uncertainty of the environment the voter faces: stability and 
clarity. For Mainwaring stable patterns of competition contribute to party 
system institutionalization, with a well institutionalized party system being 
one where “actors develop expectations and behaviour based on the 
premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and 
behaviour will prevail in the foreseeable future.”36 Following Grzymala-
Busse “clarity of competition entails easily identifiable and diverse camps 
that both voters and other parties can distinguish as opponents.”37  
How do clarity and stability of inter-party competition link up to new parties 
and their electoral success? In a situation where competition is clear and 
its patterns are stable it is relatively easy for the voter to orientate himself. 
Under these conditions information about policy orientation and coalition 
preferences is available from past experience, alternatives are clearly 
delineated and expectations can be built on this. Uncertainty is low and 
the voter is, in a sense, ‘socialized’ to this particular system and its 
constituents and will give preference to them. If, on the other hand, 
competition is not clear and its patterns change frequently, stable 
expectations about the behaviour of the existing parties cannot be built. 
Uncertainty is high. In such a situation the possible costs of electing a new 
party (resulting from increased likelihood that interests might not 
represented) can be assumed to come closer to those incurred when 
electing an established party. Hence, it is hypothesized that  
H1 Unstable and unclear patterns of competition between the 
established parties increase electoral support for new parties.  
                                                 
36
 Mainwaring & Torcal 2006 p. 205 
37
 Grzymala-Busse 2005 p. 12 
Dr. Annette Damert: Party System in Eastern Europe…           14 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Space 
Inter-party competition proceeds in a space commonly described in terms 
of policy dimensions. In a given system parties place themselves at 
distinct positions in this space. The measure most frequently used to 
characterize the positioning of parties in space and relative to each other 
is polarization. It is operationalized either as the absolute distance 
between the parties (at the extremes) or as variation around the mean 
position of the system given – weighted for vote shares or not. 
Investigating new parties entering outside the space delimited by the 
established parties Kitschelt suggests that convergence of the established 
moderate parties towards the centre improves the chances of these 
newcomers.38 Abedi analysed the effect of party system polarization on 
success of anti-establishment parties and found that in systems less 
polarized with regard to the establishment parties electoral performance of 
anti-establishment parties improves.39 Finally, Quenter extended the 
investigation to the entire set of new parties. In only one of his statistical 
models he found a correlation between low level of polarization and the 
electoral success of new parties.40  
Taken together, these studies suggest that the distribution of the 
established parties in space has an impact on new parties’ success. This 
is empirically well supported in cases where new parties enter ‘outside’ the 
space delimited by the established parties in established democracies. 
Studies addressing the issue in ‘new’ democracies do not exist. Therefore, 
the study at hand will first try to answer the question whether the inverse 
relationship between polarization and electoral success of new parties 
entering ‘outside’ also holds in the EU-10. In analogy to the studies quoted 
above it is hypothesized that 
H2 electoral success of new parties entering ‘outside’ the established 
system increases with decreasing polarization of the system. 
                                                 
38
 Kitschelt 1995  
39
 Abedi 2002 
40
 Quenter 2001  
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Where analysis is not restricted to these ‘outsiders’ empirical evidence 
becomes less convincing. A comprehensive model to investigate and 
possibly explain the success of new parties entering ‘internally’ is missing. 
This is especially surprising against the background of Harmel’s and 
Robertson’s earlier result that newly entering centre parties are the most 
successful new parties.41 Polarization is a rather unsuitable measure here 
since it essentially only describes the distance between the poles and 
provides little information about the space in between. Therefore classical 
spatial voting theory42 provides the starting point for the analysis here. It 
assumes that every voter has an ‘ideal point’ of his preferences on policy 
outcomes. He compares this ‘ideal point’ to the positions offered by the 
parties in the system and votes for the one that comes closest to his 
preferences. The more the position of the party diverges from the voter’s 
‘ideal point’, the larger his dissatisfaction. Once an alternative closer to the 
voter’s preferences arises, he is likely to switch. For new parties in Eastern 
Europe Tavits has shown that positioning of a new party close to a 
sizeable neighbour and, thus, providing a close alternative, increases 
electoral support.43 However, considering the different shapes distribution 
of parties in space can take, it becomes obvious that these offer different 
possibilities for the successful implementation of this strategy. For 
analytical reasons party systems will be grouped here into three broad 
categories. Category one is characterized by a low level of polarization 
and a number of parties positioned close to each other between the poles. 
In the second category systems are more polarized. Parties or clusters of 
parties form the poles and there is a ‘middle party’44 set well apart from 
both poles. The third category then comprises systems where the two 
extreme positions are wide apart and a ‘middle party’ is absent. For further 
                                                 
41
 Harmel & Robertson 1985 p. 512 
42
 Downs 1957, as summarized in Laver & Schilperoord 2007 and Tavits 2007b 
43
 Tavits 2007b 
44
 In the case of internal entry this paper is concerned with the positioning of parties 
relative to each other and not the absolute position of each single party on the left-right 
scale. Therefore, this paper follows Hazan and use the term ‘middle party’ throughout the 
analysis presented here. In contrast to centre parties, which are ideologically defined, 
Hazan defines a ‘middle party’ as a “spatially located party between the two opposing 
poles of the party system. A middle party will thus be located in between the major poles 
of electoral competition of a country-specific continuum, and defined only in terms of such 
poles existing on both right and left flanks of the middle” (Hazan 1997 p. 23).  
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analysis it is now necessary to introduce the notion of ‘discernible 
alternative’. A new party positioning itself close to a sizeable neighbour on 
a given issue can do so only up to a certain point. If its position comes too 
close, it is no longer discernible from that of the established party by the 
voter. Given that voting for a new party is associated with a higher level of 
uncertainty the voter will most likely stick to the familiar and vote for the 
established party. This situation is exacerbated in systems of the first 
category: in the attempt to make its position distinguishable from that of 
established party A, the new party moves closer towards established party 
B. Since B is located very close, the likelihood that the position is not 
distinguishable from that of party B increases rapidly. Hence, chances of 
success for new parties entering ‘internally’ into such systems can be 
expected to be small. Consider now categories two and three: Intuitively 
one would expect the prospects for new parties to be best in category 
three. The new party represents the closest alternative for both poles and 
has therefore hypothetically access to the entire ‘vote-pool’. In systems 
with ‘middle party’, on the other hand, one of the poles is ‘not accessible’ 
for the new party. However, conditions could be equally favourable in 
category two in case of a strong ‘middle party’: because of the smaller 
distance between middle and pole there are potentially more voters 
switching from these to the new entrant than in category three. As 
mathematically modelling the different possible settings for the last two 
categories exceeds the scope of the study presented the hypothesis is 
limited to distinguishing them from category one.  
H3 New parties entering internally will be more successful in 
configurations where the two poles of the system are set wide apart 
in space – with or without a ‘middle party’ – than in cases with low 
polarization and a number of parties close to each other between 
the poles. 
 
4.3 Campaigning 
However, even if conditions in the party system are favourable for new 
parties, they still have to tackle the hurdle to make their program, 
candidates and position opposite other contestants known. Into this they 
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naturally have to put more effort than established parties whose positions 
are known and unlikely to undergo marked changes in the short-term. 
Thus, new parties are disadvantaged. In addition electoral campaigns 
have become increasingly costly in the last decades and the countries of 
the sample selected are no exception to this trend. New parties, however, 
are often those with only limited resources. In all of the EU-10 legal 
provisions governing electoral campaigns are in place. They concern the 
financing of the campaign and regulate access to the mass-media. The 
mass media are an important factor shaping the campaign environment. 
Although direct contact between candidates and voters still plays a role, 
electoral advertising in the media and the presentation of programmatic 
issues by candidates in radio and TV has become increasingly important - 
especially so for new parties whose programs and candidates are less 
well known. For both financing and media access it can be distinguished 
between enabling and constraining mechanisms.45 Enabling mechanism 
improve the possibilities to contest elections. Given the disadvantaged 
position of new parties, their existence should improve their performance. 
Constraining mechanisms set limits applicable to all contestants in the 
same manner. They can be expected to limit the costs of campaigning 
and, thus, level the playground between established and new parties. It is 
therefore hypothesized that 
H4  the existence of both enabling and constraining mechanisms 
improves the chances of electoral success for new parties. 
 
5 Operationalization and Measurement – Competition, 
Space, and Campaigning 
Measurement46 covers the elections to the lower chambers of parliament 
in the period between 2000 and 2007 and the legislative periods leading 
up to these elections as specified for the respective variables. For reasons 
of availability of data the analysis is restricted to parliamentary parties. For 
the countries with mixed electoral systems (Hungary, Lithuania) only 
parties represented in parliament based on lists in the multi-member 
                                                 
45
 Birch 2005 
46
 A list of the political parties covered by this study is provided in Appendix 1. 
Dr. Annette Damert: Party System in Eastern Europe…           18 
 
 
 
districts will be taken into account. Parties representing ethnic minorities 
which, based on special provisions, enter parliament with results below the 
representation threshold are excluded from the analysis. 
 
5.1  Competition 
5.1.1 Operationalization  
The first independent variable is the pattern of inter-party competition. It is 
assessed with regard to its stability and clarity. A stable pattern of 
competition is characterized by a constant composition and stable identity 
of participants in competition. To cover these two dimensions the number 
of splits and mergers in the legislation period preceding the election in 
question will be assessed. Splits as well as mergers have an impact on 
the identity of a party in terms of policy orientations. Two parties merging 
will have to integrate different positions into a new program (a new 
‘identity’). The split-off of a faction of a party changes the balance of power 
within the remaining party, most likely with consequences for its policy 
making. At the same time splits and mergers change the composition of 
the party system. The variable will be assessed for the legislation period 
preceding the election in question because it is assumed that this period of 
time has the most immediate impact on voters’ perception of stable party 
identity.   
 
A clear pattern of competition is characterized by unambiguously defined 
governing alternatives. According to Mair47 the question of government 
formation is the “key defining feature” structuring inter-party competition. 
Governing alternatives are assessed with respect to the range of coalition 
partners/ composition of coalitions and the existence of parties firmly 
excluded from governing coalitions. A large range of coalition partners, i.e. 
multiparty coalitions in changing configurations blurs the distinction 
between possible alternatives - in such a situation competition is not clear. 
If a party cooperates with different partners over time these partners 
influence the range of policy options differently in every given 
                                                 
47
 Mair 1997 p. 206 
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constellation, making the position of the party in competition less well 
recognizable. Constant coalition preferences involving a small number of 
parties in any given coalition, on the other hand, unambiguously define 
governing alternatives and, hence, make competition clear. The same 
applies for the firm exclusion of certain parties. The dimension of clarity is 
assessed retrospectively, measuring the composition of governing 
coalitions between 1992 and 2000. Until 1992 in many of the countries 
under investigation government was formed by movements not yet 
‘consolidated’ into parties. Therefore, including the period between 1989 
and 1992 doesn’t make much sense in terms of determining coalition 
preferences. 
Both dimensions – stability and clarity - will be assessed as being high, 
intermediate or low. In the case of stability high corresponds to zero splits/ 
mergers. Intermediate stability equals one to two splits/mergers. The 
assessments will be coded with the numerical values 3, 2 and 1. The 
scores on each dimension will then be added up to provide the final score 
for the first independent variable. 
 
5.1.2 Measurement 
The stability of patterns of competition is assessed in the legislative period 
preceding the election in question.  
Legislation period 1  
In the legislation period leading up to the first election in question the 
patterns of competition were stable in a number of countries. Splits and 
mergers involving parliamentary parties were absent in Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Romania. The Estonian party 
system experienced major fusions. Moderates (M) and Estonian United 
People’s Party (EÜRP) merged and the People’s Union (RL, also ERL) 
incorporated the Country People’s Party (EME), Rural Union (also Country 
Union - EML) and the Pensioners and Families Party (EPPE).48 In 
Lithuania fissions from major parties concentrated in 1999/ 2000. The 
Moderate Conservative Union (NKS) split from the Homeland Union/ 
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 Wikipedia: Social Democratic Party (Estonia); People’s Union of Estonia 
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Lithuanian Conservatives (TS/LK). Modernizers from the Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) formed the Modern Christian 
Democratic Union (MKDS). Finally, a faction of the Lithuanian Social 
Democratic Party (LSDP) established the Social Democrats 2000.49 The 
Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) and the Slovenian Christian Democrats 
(SKD) merged in May 2000. This fusion was followed by the fission of a 
splinter group establishing itself under the name New Slovenia – Christian 
People’s Party (NSi).50   
The assessment for Poland and Slovakia presents some difficulty due to 
the existence of ‘election parties’ in these two countries. In Poland the 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) had been formed in 1996, combining at 
different times up to 30 parties and organizations.51 In the course of the 
legislation period more and more parties and politicians left the electoral 
alliance. New parties were established by prominent figures of the AWS.52 
Thus, although there haven’t been formal split-offs from a political party, 
the Polish system can nevertheless not be considered to present a stable 
pattern of competition. The score is therefore ‘low’. In Slovakia a 1998 
amendment of the election legislation53 resulted in the formation of the 
Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) from Democratic Party (DS), Social 
Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), Green Party of Slovakia (SZS), 
Democratic Union (DU) and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH).54 
In 2000 then Prime Minister Dzurinda launched the Slovak Democratic 
and Christian Union (SDKU) from this coalition. The SDK disintegrated in 
the course of the year 2001.55 Because, in contrast to Poland, the 
constituent parties of the ‘election party’ evolved from it more or less 
unchanged and only one new party resulted, the Slovakian system scores 
‘intermediate’. Table 2 summarizes the findings for legislation period 1. 
 
 
                                                 
49
 Clark & Prekevicius 2003 p. 554 
50
 World Political Leaders, Slovenia  
51
 Szczerbiak 2004 p. 62 
52
 Ibid. pp. 66-67 
53
 EIU 2001 p. 13 
54
 World Political Leaders, Slovakia 
55
 EIU 2001 pp. 13-14 
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Country Mergers Splits stability score 
Bulgaria 0 0 high 3 
Czech Republic 0 0 high 3 
Estonia 2 0 intermediate 2 
Hungary 0 0 high 3 
Latvia 0 0 high 3 
Lithuania 0 3 low 1 
Poland n.a. n.a. low 1 
Romania 0 0 high 3 
Slovakia n.a.  n.a.  intermediate 2 
Slovenia 1 1 intermediate 2 
 
 
Legislation period 2 
In the period following the first election under investigation the party 
systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Romania56 and Slovenia 
showed a stable pattern of competition. In Bulgaria fissions from the 
United Democratic Forces (UDF) resulted in establishment of the Union of 
Free Democrats (SSD)57 and of the Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria 
(DSB) in 2004. The Estonian party system saw two mergers: Centre Party 
(Kesk) with Pensioners Party (2005) and Pro Patria (I) with Res Publica 
(ResP, 2006). In Lithuania there have been major re-alignments through 
the fusion of LSDP and Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) and 
the formation of the (new) Lithuanian Centre Union (LCS) from LCS, 
Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS) and MKDS. The latter one also led to split 
offs from the LLS (Liberal Democratic Party -LDP) and LCS (National 
Center Party - TCS).58 The only major Polish party affected by a split was 
the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). In 2004 an SLD split-off registered 
under the name Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL). In Slovakia two 
major fusions occurred. Smer merged with the Party of Democratic Left 
(SDL), Social Democratic Alternative (SDA) and the SDSS in 2005 and 
SDKU and DS united to form SDKU-DS in 2006.59 Table 3 summarizes 
the results for the second legislation period. 
                                                 
56
 In 2001 the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) absorbed the Romanian 
Social Democratic Party (PSDR) and changed its name to Social Democratic Party 
(PSD). PSDR, however, had already been marginalized in the preceding years (Sum 
2000). The merger is therefore not considered relevant to the stability of the pattern of 
competition.  
57
 Spirova 2003 p. 14 
58
 World Political Leaders, Lithuania and Jankauskas & Zeruolis 2004 
59
 World Political Leaders, Slovakia 
Table 2 Stability of the pattern of intra-party competition in the EU-10 in the legislation 
period leading up to the elections 2000-2003. n.a. – not applicable due to the 
existence of ‘electoral parties’  
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Country mergers splits stability score 
Bulgaria 0 2 intermediate 2 
Czech Republic 0 0 high 3 
Estonia 2 0 intermediate 2 
Hungary 0 0 high 3 
Latvia 0 0 high 3 
Lithuania 2 2 low 1 
Poland 0 1 intermediate 2 
Romania 0 0 high 3 
Slovakia 2 0 intermediate 2 
Slovenia 0 0 high 3 
 
 
 
The first measure for clarity of patterns of competition is the numerical 
range of coalition partners.60 Table 4 shows the average number of parties 
in governing coalitions from 1992 up to the first and second election under 
investigation, respectively. 
 BG CZ EE HU LV LT POL RO SK SI 
→ 1st 2.0 2.25 2.75 2.67 4.78 2.0 2.0 4.0  3.0 3.75 
→ 2nd 2.25 2.4 2.78 2.5 4.54 1.8 2.16 3.3 3.14 3.67 
  
 
 
 
Concluding from this, clear governing alternatives (cut-off of three) should 
be recognizable in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Poland, whereas in the remaining countries alternatives are 
not very clear-cut. This numerical result, however, needs further 
qualification since it does not allow conclusions on whether there are 
stable coalition preferences and whether parties are firmly excluded from 
any coalition-building. A stable number of three parties in coalition can 
result from either three parties forming a coalition only with each other. On 
the other hand, one party could be stable with the remainder of the 
coalitions recruited variously from the whole spectrum of parliamentary 
parties. Closer scrutiny of the governing coalitions then reveals three 
different patterns regarding governing alternatives. Stable coalition 
                                                 
60
 Data on government composition for Bulgaria and Romania were obtained from 
Wikipedia, Politics of Bulgaria/ Romania. The compilation provided by Gregor (2004) is 
used for all other countries. 
Table 3 Stability of the pattern of intra-party competition in the EU-10 in the legislative 
period leading up to the elections 2004-2007.  
Table 4  Average number of parties in governing coalitions in the EU-10 up to 
the election series 1 (2000-2003) and 2 (2004-2007). The following 
coalitions were counted as one party: Bulgaria – UDF; Poland – AWS 
and Romania - Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) 
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preferences are to be observed in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the 
Czech Republic either Civic Democratic Party (ODS) or Czech Social 
Democratic Party (CSSD) have formed the government with the Christian 
and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-CSL) as 
(default) junior coalition partner. In Hungary the opposing camps are 
formed by the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) / Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) / 
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). Lithuania displays clear governing 
alternatives – with TS/LK dominated coalitions versus LDDP throughout 
the 1990s. The entry of the New Union/ Social Liberals (NS/SL) and 
increasing vote share of the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS) in 2000, 
however, changed power relations in parliament and made coalitions 
necessary. The score is therefore ‘intermediate’ for the second legislation 
period. A similar situation is found in Bulgaria with the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) and UDF61 in coalition with the Movement for Rights and 
Freedom (MRF) representing the alternatives up to 2001 and the National 
Movement Simeon II (NMS II) entering in 2001. 
The second group does not display clear governing alternatives. Coalitions 
in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia have included a wide range of parties in 
different combinations over time. For Estonia this finding is not consistent 
with the conclusion drawn from the comparably low average number of 
parties in coalition – although the government was formed by only two to 
three parties at a time, the combinations span nearly the entire 
parliamentary range. A last group is formed by Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. Here one of the alternatives is consolidated – the SLD in 
coalition with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) in Poland, Social Democratic 
Party (PDSR/ PSD) in Romania and the Movement for Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS) / Slovak National Party (SNS) in Slovakia. The opposing 
political camp presented itself in the form of ‘election parties’ (Poland, 
Slovakia) or an electoral alliance whose constituent parties entered 
parliament separately (Democratic Convention of Romania - CDR in 
Romania) until the first election under investigation (Poland 2001; Slovakia 
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 UDF was formally registered as a party in 1997 and the ‘alternative pole’ can therefore 
be considered consolidated – unlike in Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  
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2002; Romania 2000). These alliances, however, had disintegrated in the 
course of the legislation period. In Poland and Romania the ‘consolidated 
pole’ then came to power following the 2001/ 2000 elections, respectively. 
The opposition, however, now consisted of single parties with unknown 
coalition preferences - in Poland because two out of three were newly 
established (Law and Justice - PiS; League of Polish Families - LPR). In 
Romania the electoral defeat of the Christian Democratic National 
Peasants’ Party (PNTCD) as the major force in the previous coalition left 
two smaller parties (National Liberal Party - PNL and Democratic Party - 
PD) neither of which had been a senior partner in a coalition before. In 
Slovakia the entry of two new parties after the 2002 election further 
fragmented parliament and opened up new coalition choices in the ‘HZDS 
opposition camp’. Taken together, the score for these three party systems 
remains intermediate also for the second election period.  
In Bulgaria (MRF) and Romania (Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania 
- UDMR) ethnically-based parties serve as ‘default’ junior coalition 
partners. Firmly excluded from coalitions are the Communist Party in the 
Czech Republic (KSCM) and the nationalist parties in Hungary (Hungarian 
Justice and Life - MIEP) and Romania (Greater Romania Party - PRM).62  
Table 5 summarizes the data on the second dimension, clarity of patterns 
of competition and gives the final scores for the first independent variable. 
 Up to election series 1 Up to election series 2 
Country  Clarity of 
competition 
Score Final 
score 
Clarity of 
competition 
Score Final 
score 
Bulgaria high 3 6 intermediate 2 4 
Czech 
Republic 
high 3 6 high 3 6 
Estonia low 1 3 low 1 3 
Hungary high 3 6 high 3 6 
Latvia low 1 4 low 1 4 
Lithuania high 3 4 intermediate 2 3 
Poland intermediate 2 3 intermediate 2 4 
Romania intermediate 2 5 intermediate 2 5 
Slovakia intermediate 2 4 intermediate 2 4 
Slovenia low 1 3 low 1 4 
 
 
 
                                                 
62
 Enyedi 2006 p. 229 
Table 5 Clarity of the pattern of intra-party competition in the EU-10 up to the first 
(2000-2003) and second (2004-2007) election series of the study and final 
scores on the first independent variable.  
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Taken together, the following picture arises in terms of patterns of 
competition. Up to the first election under investigation two groups of 
party systems can be distinguished: the first group with a combined score 
of five or six presents clear alternatives to the voter that are circumscribed 
well with regard to both the identity of the party system constituents and 
possible governing coalitions. To this group belong Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Romania. The second group comprises party 
systems in which either the identity of the constituent parties is less clear 
as a result of splits and mergers, and/or where governing alternatives are 
less clearly discernible due to frequently changing composition of 
governing coalitions. This group is made up of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Up to the second election in question the first group is then reduced to 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. The second group then 
comprises Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia.  
 
5.2 Space 
5.2.1 Operationalization 
The second independent variable is available political space. There is an 
ongoing discussion in political science on whether uni - or 
multidimensional spaces are the more appropriate tool for analytical 
purposes. Summarizing the different arguments Budge points out that, in 
the meantime, the growing consensus is “that a unidimensional left-right 
space is probably the best representation of party-electoral space.”63 
Support for this comes from research carrying out “parallel analyses in 
multi-dimensional and undimensional left-right space, reaching the same 
broad conclusions in both, but more clearly in left-right space.”64 
Therefore, the analysis presented here will be concerned with assessing 
positions of parties relative to each other in the unidimensional left-right 
space.  
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 Budge 2006 p. 427 
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 Ibid. 
Dr. Annette Damert: Party System in Eastern Europe…           26 
 
 
 
As outlined above it makes sense to apply different measures depending 
on whether the new party enters ‘internally’ or ‘externally’. For the first 
case available political space is operationalized as the polarization of the 
party system. Polarization is calculated according to the formula65  
P = √ ∑ vi (xi – x)2, where vi is the vote share of party i in the preceding 
election, xi its position on the left right scale and x the mean of all parties’ 
positions on the scale. Available political space for new parties entering 
‘internally’ into party systems is operationalized by belonging to one of the 
categories of the model suggested. The results will be presented in the 
form of graphs and verbal descriptions. Naturally, party systems of the 
‘real world’ do not always fit neatly into the categories. Ethnically based 
parties and some of the nationalist parties in the EU-10 represent a 
particular problem when categorizing party systems. Ethnically based 
parties are an electoral alternative only for a distinct part of the population. 
In addition, for both ethnically based and nationalist parties the positioning 
on the left-right scale in many cases does not mirror their orientation 
towards particular policy issues.66 These parties will therefore be 
highlighted in the following categorization. The graphic representations 
should give an approximate impression on the relative strengths of the 
parties, are, however, not exactly drawn to scale in this respect. 
Data on the positioning of parties on the left-right scale are obtained from 
the expert survey published by Benoit and Laver in 2006.67 In principle the 
measures should be taken at the exact time point of the respective 
election under investigation. The expert survey, however, covers only one 
distinct point in time. For the EU-10 it was conducted in the election years 
between 2000 and 2003. The exception is Bulgaria with elections in 2001 
and the survey being conducted in 2003. Using the same spatial positions 
for the analysis of the second series of elections is justified by the finding 
in spatial analyses that parties “maintain the same relative position over 
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 Dodd 1976 as given in Robertson 1986 
66
 The positioning of the parties on the three most salient policy issues (apart from EU 
accession) identified in the Benoit & Laver expert survey was analysed. These show a 
high level of conformity to the placements on the left-right scale – except for some of the 
nationalist and ethnically based parties (data not shown). 
67
 Benoit & Laver 2006 
Dr. Annette Damert: Party System in Eastern Europe…           27 
 
 
 
time” at election level.68 Where parties are missing from the survey 
additional sources are used to estimate placement on the twenty-unit left-
right scale.  
 
5.2.2 Measurement 
The following table shows the party systems of the EU-10 ordered 
according to decreasing levels of polarization for both election series. 
1st 
election 
Polarization   2nd 
election 
Polarization  
Hungary 4.47  Latvia 5.1 
Czech 
Republic 
4.47  Poland 4.92 
Bulgaria 4.29  Czech 
Republic 
4.74 
Slovakia 3.94  Estonia 4.16 
Estonia 3.72  Slovenia 3.88 
Slovenia 3.62  Slovakia 3.86 
Latvia 3.62  Lithuania 3.49 
Lithuania 3.3  Romania 2.97 
Poland 2.94  Bulgaria 2.95 
Romania 2.36    
 
 
 
Considering additional policy dimensions for the first series of elections 
polarization can be considered to be actually higher in Romania and lower 
in Slovenia. In Romania the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the 
Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) represent extreme 
positions on decentralization and nationalism. In Slovenia all parties are 
closer on the three most salient policy issues than on the left-right scale. 
  
To assess available space for new parties entering ‘internally’ the party 
systems will first be assigned to the respective categories. There is only 
one party system fitting the first category prior to the first election in 
question – Romania. Romanian parties are found close to each other on 
the ideological scale, the largest ‘gap’ existing between PSD and 
Humanist Party of Romania (PUR). These two, however, entered the 2000 
electoral campaign as coalition. The two most salient policy issues, apart 
                                                 
68
 Budge 2006 p. 426 
Table 6 Party system polarization in the EU-10 prior to the elections 2000-2003 and 
2004-2007. Hungary is excluded from the second series because no new 
party competed in the respective election. 
Dr. Annette Damert: Party System in Eastern Europe…           28 
 
 
 
from EU-accession, in Romania at that time point have been 
decentralization and nationalism. On both these issues the nationalist 
PRM and the ‘Hungarian’ UDMR represent extreme positions69 not 
compatible with their moderate left-right placement. 
 
 
 
 
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia fit the second category 
– two poles and a ‘middle party’ – more or less well. In the Czech Republic 
the KSCM adds a minor pole on the left.  
 
 
 
 
 
In Latvia two parliamentary parties had disintegrated in the course of the 
1998-2002 legislative period – New Era (JP) and the Latvian Social-
Democratic Alliance (LSDA).70 The remaining space is delimited by the 
                                                 
69
 Benoit & Laver 2006 
70
 Bochsler 2005 p. 68 and World Political Leaders, Latvia 
Figure 1 The Romanian party system prior to the 2000 elections. Brackets indicate 
electoral coalitions. The UDMR is an ethnically based party, PRM a 
nationalist party.  
Figure 2 The Czech party system prior to the 2002 elections.  
Figure 3 The Estonian party system prior to the 2003 elections. Ref - Estonian 
 Reform Party 
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left-wing National Harmony Party (TSP) and the right-wing People’s Party 
(TP), with the nationalist For Fatherland and Freedom/ Latvian National 
Conservative Party (TB/LNNK) close by. The centre ground is occupied by 
Latvia’s Way (LC).71  
 
 
 
 
The Slovakian party system is characterized by two poles (SDL and 
SDKU/ KDH) with a strong ‘middle party’. Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) 
and SNS are an ethnically based and a nationalist party, respectively. 
 
 
The third category of party systems covers Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Lithuania. In Bulgaria BSP and ODS (UDF) delineate the available political 
space. The Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) is an ethnically 
based party not representing a choice for the majority of the electorate.  
  
 
 
                                                 
71
 Because LC was not covered by the expert survey, an approximate position was 
assigned to it based on centre-right placements reported in the literature. The 
approximate placement is indicated with a circle instead of triangle. 
Figure 4 The Latvian party system prior to the 2002 elections. Latvia’s Way (LC) is 
represented by a circle since it was not covered by the expert survey and its 
position is estimated based on its characterization as centre (right) in the 
literature. 
Figure 5 The Slovakian party system prior to the 2002 elections.  
Figure 6 The Bulgarian party system prior to the 2001 elections.  
Dr. Annette Damert: Party System in Eastern Europe…           30 
 
 
 
In Hungary the two poles are formed by MSZP/SZDSZ and FIDESZ/MDF/ 
Independent Party of Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Citizens 
(FKGP). The MIEP is an extreme nationalist party. A ‘middle party’ is 
missing in the Hungarian system. 
 
 
In Lithuania the two opposing poles are the LDDP/LSDP (in coalition) and 
TS/LK/ LCS/ LKDP. There is no ‘middle party’. 
 
 
Finally, there are Slovenia and Poland. Slovenia would fall into category 
two if United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD) / Democratic Party of 
Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) and SLS / Social Democratic Party of 
Slovenia (SDS) are considered as the poles and Liberal Democracy of 
Slovenia (LDS) as the ‘middle party’. On the other hand positions on the 
most salient policy issues are even closer than the left-right placement 
suggests. The Slovenian National Party (SNS) is a nationalist party 
representing extreme positions on e.g. foreign land ownership and 
religion. Therefore, Slovenia cannot be unambiguously sorted into one of 
the categories. 
Figure 7 The Hungarian party system prior to the 2002 elections.  
Figure 8 The Lithuanian party system prior to the 2000 elections.  
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Poland prior to the elections in 2001 also does not fit any of the 
categories. The left pole is formed by SLD and PSL. The AWS, however, 
had largely disintegrated in 200172, leaving the right part of the spectrum 
open. 
 
 
 
In summary, for the first election series conditions for success of new 
parties entering ‘internally’ should be worst in Romania and best in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Lithuania where no middle party is present and the 
poles are set wide apart. For the party systems in category two success of 
new parties would probably crucially depend on their placement relative to 
the existing parties with regard to important issues. 
 
Through the entry of (new) parties in the first election series the space 
available for positioning of parties changed in some countries. Overall, the 
spatial patterns are less clear-cut prior to the respective second elections.  
The first category still comprises Romania only. 
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 Szczerbiak 2004 p. 66-67 
Figure 10 The Polish party system prior to the 2001 elections. Note that the AWS had 
largely disintegrated in 2001 (italics and open triangle). 
Figure 9 The Slovenian party system prior to the 2000 elections.  
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In the second category there are now found Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. Latvia and Slovakia tend, 
however, towards the first category. 
In Latvia directly after the 2002 elections the position of For Human Rights 
in a United Latvia (PCTVL) represented the most left-wing. The Union of 
Greens and Farmers (ZZS) and Latvia’s First Party (LPP) replaced 
Latvia’s Way on the centre right. Before the 2006 election, however, the 
PCTVL coalition had dissolved, leaving the TSP on the left pole. Overall, 
through the new entries the space between the poles has become more 
‘crowded’. 
 
 
 
 
 
In Slovakia the main left pole has moved to the right with the entry of 
Smer. Apart from the ultra-left Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) the 
main body of the party system is now less polarized and comprises one 
additional party in the right cluster. 
 
 
II 
 
Figure 11 The Romanian party system prior to the 2004 elections. The PSD/PUR 
coalition is indicated by a bracket. 
Figure 12 The Latvian party system prior to the 2006 elections. PCTVL, the left pole 
after the 2002 elections, had dissolved and is therefore indicated in italics. 
Out of the coalition TSP remains as the old/ new left pole. LPP and New Era 
(JL) are new parties that had entered in 2002. 
Figure 13 The Slovakian party system prior to the 2006 elections. Smer and Alliance of 
the New Citizen (ANO), the two 2002 newcomers, are circled. The KSS does 
not represent a new party. 
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In Estonia the basic arrangement of two poles and a ‘middle party’ 
remained unchanged even after the 2003 entry of Res Publica. 
  
 
 
Bulgaria and Lithuania are new in this category – ‘middle parties’ are now 
present with the National Movement Simeon II (NMS II) in Bulgaria and 
the LLS in Lithuania. 
 
  
 
 
 
In the Czech Republic, the last member of category two, the system 
remained unchanged. 
The third category for the second election series comprises Slovenia and 
Poland. In Poland the left pole is now formed by Citizen’s Platform (PO), 
PiS and LPR. NSi has entered on the far right in Slovenia. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 The Estonian party system prior to the 2007 elections. ResP as a new party 
having entered in 2003 is circled. 
Figure 15 The Bulgarian (top) and Lithuanian (bottom) party systems prior to the 2005/ 
2004 elections. New parties are circled. 
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Summing up over the categorization for the second election series the 
least favourable conditions for new party success when entering internally 
can again be expected for Romania, followed now by Slovakia and, 
possibly, Latvia. In general, a trend towards less polarized and internally 
more 'crowded' party systems is observed - possibly making internal entry 
of new parties more difficult. The exceptions are Poland and Slovenia 
where the party systems have become more polarized. With regard to the 
second category (poles and middle party) where issue placement and the 
provision of still discernible alternatives are the crucial factors, the 
Bulgarian and Lithuanian party systems might offer opportunities for the 
internal entry of new parties. The following table summarizes the 
assignment of the party systems to the respective categories prior to the 
first and second election, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 The Polish (top) and Slovenian (bottom) party systems prior to the 2005/ 
2004 elections. New parties are circled. SO - Self-Defence of the Republic of 
Poland; SMS - Party of Slovenian Youth 
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Cat. I Cat. II Cat. III ambiguous 
1st election Romania Czech Republic Bulgaria Slovenia 
  Estonia Hungary Poland 
  Latvia Lithuania  
  Slovakia   
2nd election Romania Bulgaria Slovenia  
  Czech Republic Poland  
  Estonia   
  Latvia   
  Lithuania   
  Slovakia   
 
Table 7  Assignment of the party systems in the EU-10 to spatial categories prior 
  to the first and second election under investigation. 
 
5.3 Campaigning 
5.3.1 Operationalization 
The third independent variable is conditions of campaigning. It will be 
assessed along the dimensions of enabling and constraining mechanism 
of campaign financing as well as of regulations on media access. In the 
case of campaign financing enabling mechanisms will be measured as the 
presence or absence of state subsidies for campaigning that are 
vote/representation - independent. Only these can be considered to be 
favourable for a new party. Constraining mechanisms are determined as 
the presence or absence of legal regulations setting limits on campaign 
spending. Regulations on media access will be measured with regard to 
provision of equal and free access to the media (enabling) and prohibition 
of paid advertisement (constraining). Equal access means that 
parliamentary parties are not advantaged. Each of the measures is 
numerically coded zero or one for presence or absence of the respective 
factor. The individual scores on enabling and constraining mechanisms for 
campaign financing and media access are added up to provide a final 
score for the dimensions. 
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5.3.2 Measurement 73 
Bulgaria  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
There is no special subsidy for election campaigns. In general state 
funding goes to parties that have gained at least 1% of the vote.  
Spending limit 
There is a spending limit for national elections.74  
Media 
Free airtime is provided by national TV and Radio. Time for debates is 
divided half-half between parliamentary (at least) and non-parliamentary 
parties. Teams, form and topics of the debates are, however, established 
by a committee in which parties are represented according to their seat 
share.  
This addition was withdrawn in 2005. Paid advertising on private stations 
is not prohibited.75 
Czech Republic  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
Campaign financial assistance is dependent on vote share. 
Spending limit 
There is no spending limit in place.76 
Media 
There is free broadcasting time equally distributed between all parties 
running in the election. There is a ban on paid advertising.  
Estonia  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy  
No 
Spending limit 
There is no spending limit, but disclosure is required.77 
Media 
                                                 
73
 All data in this section have been obtained from primary legislation, if not otherwise 
indicated. Legal texts were accessed via http://www.legislationline.org on August 12th and 
13th 2007, again, if not indicated otherwise. A list of the respective legal texts is given in 
Appendix 2.  
74
 Wannat & Farnsworth 2005 p. 46 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 Perottino 2005 p. 20 
77
 IDEA 2003 p. 205 
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Advertising is prohibited on public TV and Radio. Debates on public TV 
favour larger parties (2007). There is no ban on paid advertising on private 
stations but broadcasters have to grant similar opportunities for all 
parties.78 
Hungary  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
Hungary subsidizes candidates before the election. In addition public 
premises and equipment is provided under conditions of equality.79 
Spending limit 
There is a limit on campaign expenditure. 
Media 
Political advertising is allowed, but equal conditions have to be ensured. At 
least one political announcement free of charge has to be offered by state 
TV. In addition there has to be one advertisement for every nominating list 
on the last day before the elections. Paid advertising in private media is 
not banned.80  
Latvia  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
No 
Spending limit 
In 2004 the campaign expenditure limit was set at 0.2 LVL/ vote.81  
Media 
Limited amount of free airtime is granted to all contestants on equal basis. 
Political platforms are published free of charge.82 There are no limits to 
paid advertising.83 
Lithuania  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
No 
Spending limit 
                                                 
78
 OSCE/ODIHR 2007a p. 8 
79
 Ikstens et al. 2002 p. 34 
80
 OSCE/ODIHR 2002a p. 10 
81
 Ikstens 2005 
82
 Ikstens et al. 2002 p. 37; Auers & Ikstens 2003 p. 92  
83
 OSCE/ODIHR 2007b p. 12 
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De jure there is no campaign expenditure limit. Parties are, however, 
obliged to set up a special election account that is limited in the amount 
that can be transferred to it. This imposes a de facto spending limit. 
Media 
Free airtime is granted to all participants in the election on an equal basis. 
There is no ban on paid advertising. Since this, however, has to be 
financed from the election account as well, conditions for contestants are 
levelled to an extent by the account limit. (score 0.5 for ban on paid 
advertising)   
Poland  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
There is refunding depending on the number of seats gained. 
Spending limit 
There is a limit to campaign expenditure.84  
Media 
Free broadcasting time is granted on equal for all contestants. Paid 
advertisement is not prohibited.  
Romania  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
No 
Spending limit 
2000 - There is no cap to campaign expenditure. The ceiling for donations 
is doubled in election years.85  
2004 – The 2003 “Law on the financing of the activities of political parties 
and of election campaigns”86 introduces a campaign spending limit.  
Media 
2000 – Airtime on state radio and TV is provided for parliamentary parties 
at a subsidized rate. All other parties profit from a prize specially set for the 
time of the electoral campaign. Distribution of airtime has to ensure that 
parliamentary parties have two times more broadcasting time at their 
                                                 
84
 Ikstens et al. 2002 p. 49 
85
 OSCE/ODIHR 2001 pp. 12-13 
86
 Law No. 43, 21.01.2003  
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disposal than extra- parliamentary ones.87 Paid advertising is not 
prohibited.88 
2004 – Under the new electoral law public as well as private stations have 
to provide access to political parties for campaign purposes free of charge. 
Distribution of airtime on public radio and TV proceeds according to the 
number of seats in parliament. Private stations are bound to distribute 
75% of their campaign airtime to parliamentary parties and 25% to non-
parliamentary parties. “Any commercial publicity procedure using the print 
and broadcast media for electoral propaganda purposes shall be 
prohibited.”89  
Slovakia  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
There are no separate state funds for campaigning. 
Spending limit 
There is a limit to campaign expenditure.90 
Media 
2002 – Free airtime is granted on public TV and radio. Equal access for all 
election participants is ensured.91 Advertising on private stations is “no 
longer expressly prohibited, however, what is permitted remains subject to 
controversy.92 
2006 – The new electoral law abolishes free airtime. On state radio and 
TV equal access for all contestants is granted. Advertising on private 
stations is allowed, however, limited in time per contestant. The score on 
paid advertising is therefore 0.5. 
Slovenia  
Vote - share - independent campaign subsidy 
Campaign financial assistance is dependent on vote share. 
Spending limit 
                                                 
87
 Law No. 68, 15.07.1992 
88
 According to Ikstens et al. 2002 (p. 52) paid advertising is prohibited. The respective 
law does not contain any provisions to this effect.  
89
 Law on the elections for the chamber of deputies and the Senate (2004) Art. 55(4) 
90
 OSCE/ODIHR 2002b p. 8 and Ikstens et al. 2002 p. 59 
91
 Ikstens et al. 2002 p. 58 
92
 OSCE/ODIHR 2002b p. 10 
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There is a spending limit.93  
Media 
There is a provision for equal airtime for parliamentary parties free of 
charge. Non-parliamentary parties must have at least one third of the total 
time allocated. There is no ban on paid advertising. 
 A summary comparison of the campaign conditions with assigned 
numerical values is shown in Table 8.  
 Campaign financing  Media access 
 Enabling  Constraining    Enabling  Constraining   
 State 
subsidies 
Spending 
limit 
Final 
score 
 Free, equal 
airtime 
Ban on paid 
advertising 
Final 
score 
HU 2002 1 1 2 CZ 2002 1 1 2 
BG 2001 0 1 1 SK 2002 1 0.5 1.5 
LT 2000 0 1 1 LT 2000 1 0.5 1.5 
PO 2001 0 1 1 HU 2002 1 0 1 
SK 2002 0 1 1 LV 2002 1 0 1 
SI 2000 0 1 1 PO 2001 1 0 1 
CZ 2002 0 0 0 BG 2001 0.5 0 0.5 
LV 2002 0 0 0 EE 2003 0 0 0 
EE 2003 0 0 0 RO 2000 0 0 0 
RO 2000 0 0 0 SI 2000 0 0 0 
        
HU 2006 1 1 2 CZ 2006 1 1 2 
BG 2005 0 1 1 LT 2004 1 0.5 1.5 
LV 2006 0 1 1 HU 2006 1 0 1 
LT 2004 0 1 1 LV 2006 1 0 1 
PO 2005 0 1 1 PO 2005 1 0 1 
RO 2004 0 1 1 RO 2004 0 1 1 
SK 2006 0 1 1 BG 2005 0.5 0 0.5 
SI 2004 0 1 1 SK 2006 0 0.5 0.5 
CZ 2006 0 0 0 EE 2007 0 0 0 
EE 2007 0 0 0 SI 2004 0 0 0 
 
 
 
Following from this the potentially most favourable conditions for new 
parties should be found in Hungary (campaign financing) and the Czech 
Republic (media access) in both election series. In the campaign leading 
up to the second election there are only the Czech Republic and Estonia 
still without spending limit. With regard to media access the picture is 
largely unchanged. 
  
 
                                                 
93
 OSI 2002 p. 604 
Table 8 Enabling and constraining mechanisms of campaign regulations in the EU-10 
in the election series 2000-2003 and 2004-2007. Countries are listed in 
descending order of their final score on the respective dimension. 
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6 The Dependent Variable – Success of New Parties 
6.1 Operationalization 
The dependent variable is the electoral success of new parties. Both terms 
of the variable require, however, some qualification. In the widest sense of 
the term a new party is a party that has never before occurred on the 
ballot in the conformation in that it contests the election in question. This 
includes parties resulting from fusions and splits of established parties as 
well as genuinely new parties. In the available literature ‘new party’ is 
operationalized differentially. Harmel and Robertson94 list new parties by 
their different origins but do not differentiate them in their aggregate 
analysis. More recently Sikk confined his analyses to genuinely new 
parties defined as “the ones that are not successors of any previous 
parliamentary parties, have a novel name as well as structure, and do not 
have any important figures from past democratic politics among its major 
members”.95 Based on the cartel-party theory he argues that all other 
technically new parties “originate from the already established political 
circles, thus contributing to inner changes, but not altering much the 
conventional pattern of party politics”.96 Tavits97 excludes only mergers 
from her analysis. Split-offs and genuinely new parties compete under 
comparable conditions. They have to recruit members, develop 
organizational capacity and make their political aims known. Mergers, on 
the other hand, “are in fact established parties that have reorganized to 
survive”.98 Often they have cooperated in coalitions before and the policy 
preferences of the merger are predictable for the voter. This paper 
therefore follows Tavits and defines a ‘new party’ as a party that 
- occurs on the ballot for the first time, and 
- has been established following split-off from an established party or 
is a genuinely new party.  
                                                 
94
 Harmel & Robertson 1985 
95
 Sikk 2003 p. 8 
96
 Sikk 2005 p. 399 
97
 Tavits 2006 
98
 Bolin 2007 p. 8 
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The second question in operationalization of the dependent variable 
concerns the definition of electoral success. Harmel and Robertson99 do 
not set a cut-off for success (percentage of vote) but statistically correlate 
their independent variables to increasing electoral support. Müller-
Rommel100 defines a party as electoral successful if it has gained more 
than 4% of the vote on average. Quenter101 takes the passing of the 
threshold for parliamentary representation as the measure of success. 
Tavits measures success of new parties by the “vote share for all new 
parties in a given election”.102  
Given the fact that I don’t have any statistical tools at my disposal and 
information about parties not clearing the representational threshold in a 
number of cases is impossible to obtain, this paper defines an electoral 
successful party here as a party that has passed the threshold for 
parliamentary representation.  
 
6.2 Measurement 
Measuring success of new parties presupposes that new parties have 
competed in the elections in question. This is the case for all elections in 
the EU-10 between 2000 and 2007, except for the Hungary in 2006. This 
election will therefore be excluded from analysis. Data for the dependent 
variable were obtained using the electoral database of the 'Project on 
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist 
Europe' and the election sites for the respective countries on Wikipedia. In 
cases where data from these sources were incomplete, the homepages of 
the national election commissions103 were used. Information on founding 
dates and origin of parties was collected from the Wikipedia English 
version and supplemented where necessary from the respective countries’ 
Wikipedia editions.  
The following table gives an overview on the new parties entering 
parliaments in the EU-10 in elections between 2000 and 2007, the 
                                                 
99
 Harmel & Robertson 1985 
100
 Müller-Rommel 1992 p. 192 
101
 Quenter 2001 p. 27 
102
 Tavits 2007a p. 12 
103
 A list of web-links to national election commission is provided in the reference section. 
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percentage of the vote gained and the position they entered into on the 
left-right scale.  
Country Year  Party Vote share Position 
Bulgaria 2001 NMS II 42.74% Internally  
 2005 DSB 6.44% Right 
Estonia 2003 Res Publica 24.62% Internally  
 2007 Green Party 7.1% Left 
Latvia 2002 New Era (JL) 23.98% Internally  
 
 LPP 9.57% Internally  
Lithuania104 2000 NS-SL  19.64% Internally  
 2004 Labour Party (DP) 28.44% Left 
Poland 2001 PO 12.68% Right 
 
 PiS 9.5% Right  
 
 LPR 7.87% Right  
Slovakia 2002 SDKU 15.04% Right Pole 
 
 Smer 13.46% Left  
 
 ANO 8.01% Right Pole 
Slovenia 2000 NSi 8.66% Right  
  SMS 4.34%  Internally  
       
          
In summary the following picture arises for the first and second election in 
question, respectively. There were new parties in parliament after the  
1st election in      2nd election in 
Bulgaria       Bulgaria 
Estonia        Estonia 
Lithuania       Lithuania 
Latvia 
Poland  
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
An additional level of analysis is introduced by looking at new parties 
having obtained between 1% of the vote and the respective 
representational threshold. 
1st election        2nd election 
Czech Republic       Latvia 
Hungary        Poland 
Romania        Slovakia 
         Slovenia 
                                                 
104
 Multi-member districts only 
Table 9 New parties entering parliament in the EU-10 in the election series 2000-
2003 and 2004-2007.  
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7 Results and Discussion 
Comparing the groups resulting from measurement of the first 
independent variable with the countries where new parties entered 
parliament the following picture arises: For the first series of elections 
investigated here the party systems in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia are rather unstable in terms of the identity 
of participants in competition and/ or do not display clear governing 
alternatives. In line with the hypothesis new parties gained vote shares 
above the representation threshold in the elections in question in these 
countries. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania stable and 
clear competition patterns are associated with new parties failing to pass 
the representation threshold. This, again, is in line with the hypothesis 
established. Thus, in 90% of the cases low levels of stability and clarity of 
competition can explain the success of new parties. The exception is 
Bulgaria where a new party gained a sizeable vote share in the 2001 
elections despite stable and clear competition patterns.  
With respect to the second series of elections stability and clarity of 
competition can explain why new parties gained less than 1% of the vote 
in the Czech Republic and Romania. In the group with less stable and/or 
clear patterns of competition new parties could not pass the representation 
threshold in Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia - contradicting the 
hypothesis. However, in these countries new parties gained between 1% 
of the vote and the respective representation threshold. Thus, they were 
more successful in terms of votes than in systems with stable and clear 
competition patterns. In Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania new parties 
passed the representation threshold.  
Taken together these results suggest that the stability and clarity of 
patterns of competition has an influence on the success of new parties. 
The less stable and clear patterns of competition are, the higher the 
likelihood of successful new parties. The findings do, however, also show 
that clear patterns of competition and a stable identity of the participants 
need not be an obstacle to successful entry of new parties – as the case 
of Bulgaria (2001) shows. With regard to party system inherent variables 
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the exhaustion of government alternatives - shown by Tavits105 to have 
high explanatory power for the success of new parties - could have played 
a role in this case. The two major parties, BSP and UDF, had governed 
alternately throughout the 1990s, without, however, being able to solve 
major economic and administrative problems. A 'precipitating' factor 
exogenous to the party system could also have been the personality of the 
former king as leader of the new party. Thus, although single variables 
may explain a majority of cases, party system development by entry of 
new parties is clearly contingent on a larger number of factors, both 
endogenous and exogenous to the party system.   
 
Analysis of the relationship between available political space as the 
second independent variable and the success of new parties presents a 
difficulty related to the dependent variable. As outlined above the 
measures for available political space should be different dependent on 
where the new party positions itself relative to the established system. 
Where new parties have been successful such information is usually 
available. For ‘unsuccessful’ new parties it is in most cases impossible to 
obtain. Therefore the following analysis can only establish relationships for 
the successful new parties and cannot provide deeper insights in cases 
where new parties failed.  
 For the first election series there are only Slovakia and Slovenia 
where new parties entered ‘outside’ the established system. Poland is a 
more ambiguous case, since the new parties replaced the AWS. In the 
second election series all successful new parties entered ‘outside’ the 
established system or at the poles. Overall, there is no correlation 
between party system polarization and successful ‘external’ entry. 
However, due to the paucity of cases these findings have to be considered 
with caution.  
 ‘Internal entries’ to which the proposed model might be applicable 
were observed only in the first election series. They are found in the third 
category (poles set wide apart, no ‘middle party’) with Bulgaria and 
                                                 
105
 Tavits 2007a 
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Lithuania.106 These are also the two party systems where the largest 
distance between neighbours can be found. Internal entries also occurred 
in Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia – party systems of my second 
category in which a middle party existed prior to the new entry. In both 
Estonia and Latvia the new parties entered between the ‘middle party’ and 
the right pole and gained around 25% of the vote. In Slovakia and 
Slovenia ANO and SMS, respectively entered at or close to the poles and 
received a lower share of the votes than the Estonian and Latvian 
newcomers.  
 Thus, a preliminary analysis using the model suggested shows that 
first, the hypothesis that there will be more successful ‘internal’ entrants in 
the party systems of categories two and three holds. One has, however, to 
bear in mind that the first category comprises Romania only, where 
information on the unsuccessful new parties was not available. Second, 
the positioning between the ‘middle party’ and one of the poles in Estonia 
and Latvia proved to be the best strategy for new parties in systems with a 
‘middle party’. Third, highly polarized systems of category three are prone 
to the successful entrance in the middle. Finally, taken in isolation the 
available political space is not sufficient to explain success or failure of 
new parties. The Czech Association of Independents (SNK), although 
entering at a relative position comparable to the new entrants in Latvia and 
Estonia, failed to pass the representation threshold. Characteristics of 
competition, with the middle party representing the ‘default’ coalition 
partner of the poles, may be the ‘overriding’ factor here.  
Based on the partly inconclusive statistical results he obtained in his 
analyses Quenter suspects that “one might predict […] good prospects of 
success for new parties in countries with comparably less fragmented, but 
relatively highly polarized party systems, in which changes of government 
are more frequent”.107 These would be the party systems covered here in 
categories two and three. Thus, it would certainly be worthwhile to run 
Quenter’s statistical models (a) separately for new parties entering 
                                                 
106
 In addition the Hungarian Centre Party only just failed to pass the representation 
threshold. 
107
 Quenter 2001 p. 108, author’s translation 
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internally and (b) including the first election series in the EU-10 covered 
here. In addition, more precise mathematical modelling - taking into 
account the strength of the existing ‘middle party’ and the distance 
between parties’ positions - could facilitate the establishment of the exact 
relationship between the ‘type’ of party system, the positioning of new 
parties and their success.  
 
With regard to the impact of campaign financing regulations the analysis 
reveals that provisions that could be assumed to counteract the 
disadvantaged position of new parties in the election campaign do not 
have an influence on their success. In Hungary, supposedly providing the 
most favourable conditions for new parties in the first series of elections, 
the Centre party failed to cross the representation threshold. On the other 
hand, Estonia presented the formally least favourable conditions in both 
election series. However, new parties gained parliamentary representation 
in 2003 as well as in 2007. Up to date the literature provides no 
comparable data on the success of new parties in relationship to the 
campaign environment as operationalized here. In a recent study Bolin108 
has analyzed the impact of campaign financing regulations on the entry of 
new parties in electoral competition. He found that “a legal cap on 
campaign spending is favourable for new parties”, but concedes that this 
result has to be treated with caution due to the paucity of cases where 
such regulations had been in place. A second point has to be made in 
order to assess the above negative result properly. In the case of a cap on 
campaign spending measuring the presence or absence of a legal 
regulation might not be sufficient to capture the actual conditions for new 
parties in the respective countries. Provisions on campaign spending limits 
have to be reasonable and enforced properly. A spending limit 
unreasonably low if compared to the actual campaign expenditures will 
most likely not be observed and, hence, cannot be expected to improve 
conditions for new parties. The same applies for a legal cap existing on 
paper only. Anecdotic evidence suggests that e.g. the spending limit for 
                                                 
108
 Bolin 2007 
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the 2006 election Latvia109 has been unrealistically low. Unfortunately, 
data on reasonability and enforcement comparable across the countries 
and time period of this study have not been available. An interesting 
approach in the assessment of the impact of money on the success of 
new parties has recently been taken by Sikk.110 His model of 
restrictiveness of party financing regimes includes the measure of share of 
public funding in campaign expenditures of parliamentary parties: a 
decrease in the share of public funding in campaign expenditures for 
parliamentary parties would, according to the model, increase the chances 
for new parties. He can, however, provide only partial empirical support for 
this hypothesis.  
Similarly to the campaign financing regulations, provisions that should 
level the playing field with regard to media access do not seem to have an 
impact on the success of new parties. Probably an analysis of the actual 
share in media presence of established and new parties during the 
electoral campaign could solve the discrepancy between obviously 
‘disadvantaging’ legal provisions and the success of new parties observed 
in some cases. 
   
8 Conclusion and Outlook 
Analyzing two election series in the EU-10 it has been provided evidence 
that the stability and clarity of patterns of competition between established 
parties shape the environment for new parties and has an influence on 
their success. The determination of the effect of distribution of parties in 
political space on new parties’ success clearly requires further 
investigation. Mathematical modelling of the three 'spatial types' of party 
systems proposed here might serve as a starting point for a static analysis. 
More attractive, however, would be a dynamic model taking into account 
the permanent changes party systems undergo in response to changing 
societal conditions. Laver and Schilperoord111 recently extended their 
agent-based spatial model of party competition to the analysis of the "birth 
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 OSCE/ODIHR 2007b p. 8 
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 Sikk  2006 pp. 46-47 
111
 Laver & Schilperoord 2007 
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and death of political parties." In this model different adaptive rules for 
party leaders as well as updated/ cumulative citizens' dissatisfaction are 
considered to explain the establishment of new parties. Discussing their 
results the authors remark that currently accepted spatial models assume 
that citizens switch "to the closest party at any given instant … when their 
current party is no longer the closest to them."112  Future work, in addition, 
has to deal with the fact that "citizens develop more long-standing party 
affiliations that respond only slowly to a changing configuration of party 
positions."113 This, however, is exactly what mediates, as an intervening 
variable, the effects of stability and clarity of competition on new parties' 
success - the first independent variable investigated in the analysis 
presented here. Hence, an advanced dynamic model of the type 
developed by Laver and Schilperoord would also integrate this particular 
influence and help to answer not only the question why new parties 'are 
born,' but also under which conditions they are successful.  
With regard to campaign conditions future analysis has to go beyond the 
analysis of legal regulations. It must take into account enforcement and 
should analyse the actual implementation of legal provisions on media 
access. In addition, the internet and mobile telecommunications play an 
increasing role in election campaigns without being, up to the present, 
explicitly regulated by law. Hence, these media should be included in 
future investigations.  
Finally, the analysis presented has only dealt with two election periods still 
very close in time to the 'origins' of the party systems in the EU-10. To 
arrive at more generally applicable conclusions certainly a larger number 
of elections will have to be analysed and results will have to be compared 
to those obtained for established democracies.  
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113
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Appendix 1  Political Parties in the EU-10 
Bulgaria 
BSP    Bulgarian Socialist Party 
DSB    Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria 
MRF    Movement for Rights and Freedom 
NMS II   National Movement Simeon II 
ODS or UDF   United Democratic Forces 
SSD    Union of Free Democrats  
Czech Republic 
CSSD    Czech Social Democratic Party 
KDU-CSL Christian and Democratic Union – 
Czechoslovak People’s Party 
KSCM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
ODS Civic Democratic Party 
SNK Association of Independents 
Estonia 
EER Estonian Greens 
EML Estonian Rural Union (also Country Union) 
EPPE Estonian Pensioners and Families Party 
EÜRP Estonian United People’s Party 
I Pro Patria (Isamaaliit) 
M Moderates; since 2004 Social Democratic Party 
– SDE  
Kesk Estonian Centre Party 
Ref Estonian Reform Party 
ResP Res Publica 
RL Estonian People’s Union (previously Estonian 
Country People’s Party – EME) also: ERL 
Hungary 
FIDESZ Alliance of Young Democrats 
FKGP Independent Party of Smallholders, Agrarian 
Workers and Citizens 
MDF Hungarian Democratic Forum 
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MIEP Hungarian Justice and Life 
MSZP Hungarian Socialist Party 
SZDSZ Alliance of Free Democrats 
Latvia 
JL New Era 
JP New Era 
LC Latvia’s Way 
LPP Latvia’s First Party 
LSDA Latvian Social-Democratic Alliance 
PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia 
TB/LNNK For Fatherland and Freedom/ Latvian National 
Conservative Party 
TP People’s Party 
TSP National Harmony Party 
ZZS Union of Greens and Farmers 
Lithuania 
DP Labour Party 
LCS Lithuanian Centre Union 
LDDP Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party 
LDP Liberal Democratic Party 
LLS Lithuanian Liberal Union 
LKDP Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party 
LSDP Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (since 2001 
name of the LDDP/ LSDP fusion) 
MKDS Modern Christian Democratic Union 
NKS Moderate Conservative Union 
NS/SL New Union/ Social Liberals 
TCS National Center Party 
TS/LK Homeland Union/ Lithuanian Conservatives 
Poland 
AWS Solidarity Electoral Action 
LPR League of Polish Families 
PiS Law and Justice 
PO Citizen’s Platform 
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PSL Polish Peasant Party 
SDPL Social Democracy of Poland 
SLD Democratic Left Alliance 
SO Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland 
UW Freedom Union 
Romania 
CDR Democratic Convention of Romania 
PD Democratic Party 
PNL National Liberal Party 
PNTCD Christian Democratic National Peasants’ Party 
PRM Greater Romania Party 
PSD Social Democratic Party (since 2001; before 
PDSR) 
PSDR Romanian Social Democratic Party (until 
merger with PDSR in 2001) 
PUR Humanist Party of Romania 
UDMR Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania 
Slovakia 
ANO Alliance of the New Citizen 
DS Democratic Party 
DU Democratic Union 
HZDS Movement for Democratic Slovakia 
KDH Christian Democratic Movement 
KSS Communist Party of Slovakia 
SDA Social Democratic Alternative 
SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition 
SDKU Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 
SDL Party of Democratic Left 
SDSS Social Democratic Party of Slovakia 
Smer Direction 
SMK Hungarian Coalition Party 
SNS Slovak National Party 
SZS Green Party of Slovakia 
Slovenia 
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DeSUS Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia 
LDS Liberal Democracy of Slovenia 
NSi New Slovenia – Christian People’s Party 
SDS until 2003 Social Democratic Party of Slovenia; 
after 2003 Slovenian Democratic Party 
SKD  Slovenian Christian Democrats  
SLS Slovenian People’s Party 
SMS Party of Slovenian Youth 
SNS Slovenian National Party 
ZLSD United List of Social Democrats  
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Appendix 2 Legal Regulations governing 
Campaign Financing and Media 
Access in the EU-10 
Bulgaria Elections of Members of Parliament Act (2001, amended 
2005)  
Czech Rep. Act on the Elections to the Parliament of the Czech Republic 
(1995) 
Estonia Riigikogu Election Act (2002, amended 2006)  
Hungary Act C on Electoral Procedure (1997); Law on the operation 
and financial functioning of political parties (1989) 
Latvia Law on national election campaign (1994); Law on the 
financing of political organizations (1995, amended 2002) 
Lithuania Law on elections to the Seimas (1992, amended 2004) 
Poland Act on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and to 
the Senate of the Republic of Poland (2001) 
Romania Law on Political Parties (1996); Law on the elections for the 
chamber of deputies and the Senate (1992 and 2004) 
Slovakia Act on Election of the National Council (1999); Law on 
Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic” 
(2004); Act on limitation of expenditures of the political 
parties on advertising before elections to the National Council 
of the Slovak Republic (1994) 
Slovenia The Law on Radio and Television (amended 2001); Election 
Campaign Act (1994, amended 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
